Abstract-We draw an analogy of biological cyanide poisoning to security attacks in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks. When a circulatory system is treated as an enclosed network space, a hemoglobin is treated as a mobile node, and a hemoglobin binding with cyanide ion is treated as a compromised node (which cannot bind with oxygen to furnish its oxygentransport function), we show how cyanide poisoning can reduce the probability of oxygen/message delivery to a "negligible" quantity. Like modern cryptography, security problem in our network-centric model is defined on the complexity-theoretic concept of "negligible", which is asymptotically sub-polynomial with respect to a pre-defined system parameter x. Intuitively, the parameter x is the key length n in modern cryptography, but is changed to the network scale, or the number of network nodes N, in our model. Based on this new analytic model, we show that RP (n-runs) complexity class with a virtual oracle can formally model the cyanide poisoning phenomenon and similar network threats. This new analytic approach leads to a new view of biological threats from the perspective of network security and complexity theoretic study. 
For the ease of formal presentation, we list the notions used in this paper below: In bioinformatics, analyzing mobility related problems is a new challenge. Typical research efforts in sequence alignment, gene finding, genome assembly, protein structure alignment, protein structure prediction, and the modeling of evolution do not study molecule level mobility and related security threats. For instance, many biological threats use the circulatory system as their entrance to disable the life sustaining functions. Related analysis must study a large amount of molecules moving in the circulatory system. Due to the probabilistic nature of each molecule's mobility pattern and the intractable complexity caused by the sheer amount of molecules, it is a non-trivial challenge to deliver a meaningful analysis to answer the following questions: How do we quantitatively measure the impact of a simple algorithmic attacking strategy in an environment with probabilistic mobility and huge amount of nodes? What types of metrics can we use to quantify the highly complex behavior in the system (in the example, the circulatory system)?
In this paper, we answer these questions by identifying the connection between the biological threats and randomized Part of the work is funded by NSF grant DBI-0529012.
First, we adopt a formal approach to characterize a general category of random algorithms, which belongs to the family of Monte Carlo algorithms with 1-side or 2-side errors. In a complex self-organizing network, it is impossible to determine every system behavior in a deterministic manner. We have to adopt a probabilistic framework. For example, in regard to security attacks and countermeasures, we speak of the "feasibility or infeasibility" of breaking a network system rather than the "possibility or impossibility" of breaking the same system. We seek to prove that the success (or failure) probability of any network protocol is negligible (see formal definition in Section III) in regard to a network metric x, which is the network scale N (the total number of network nodes) in this paper. Second, not all Monte Carlo algorithms are qualified in the new formal model. As depicted in Figure 1 , we explore a constraint on the difference between Las Vegas algorithms and Monte Carlo algorithms. If an algorithm belongs to Las Vegas random algorithm family, then the algorithm always produces correct result but the algorithm execution is probabilistically efficient, sometimes inefficient. If an algorithm belongs to Monte Carlo algorithm family, then the algorithm execution is always efficient but with probabilistic 1-side or 2-side errors/deviations from the ideal Las Vegas results. In particular, we use a special Monte Carlo algorithm family with clearly defined metric bounds:
1) The special class of Monte Carlo algorithm used in this work belongs to complexity class P. It ends in polynomial-time (or polynomial-step) and with negligible deviation E(x) from the ideal result (which is defined by a counterpart Las Vegas algorithm). 2) Moreover, as depicted in Figure 1 , the deviation stays as negligible in polynomial steps poly(x). That is, the negligible deviation e(x) is an asymptotic invariant in terms of an input metric x.
3) The input metric x of any polynomial discussed in this paper is defined as N, the total number of network members in the target network. We prove the depicted polynomial-time invariant negligibility property to illustrate how a node-wise simple local behavior affects global behaviors of the entire system with N < poly(N) peer nodes. Therefore, we seek to explain node-wise local behaviors in a complex probabilistic system, then the corresponding global behaviors can be deduced safely due to the important invariant property.
Third, we define a concept of "QVQ polynomial-time algorithm" (or "QVQ polynomial-step protocol" in network term) by introducing a QVQ oracle in network complexity theory. Given a "global virtual god" (QVQ) that virtually oversees the network, we show that the number of steps in a protocol is indeed polynomially bounded in regard to the number of nodes N. This includes the following modeling aspects:
. RP (n-runs) model: Like J3PP class used in modern cryptography, our RP (n-runs) class characterizes probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. In cyanide poisoning, the circulatory oxygen-transport function is reduced into negative gVg -RP class, which has negligible success probability e(N) at every step and globally.
. Polynomially-bounded adversary: The adversary is allowed to compromise a fraction 0 of N (since O N is a polynomial of N) network members. In cyanide poisoning, a hemoglobin binding with cyanide ion but not oxygen is a compromised node, otherwise it is uncompromised. The cyanide ions do not (directly) kill biological cells or organs like the heart (the centralized server), but rather disable the fully distributed oxygentransport function. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II we describe cyanide poisoning in a biological view. In Section III we present the details of our formal model to show the reason why cyanide poisoning is in negative gVg -RP complexity class. Finally Section IV summarizes the paper.
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Oxygen Fig. 2 . Abstraction of circulatory system as an enclosed network space S holding the mobile hemoglobin nodes II. BIOLOGICAL CYANIDE POISONING Hemoglobin (Hb) is the oxygen-transport metalloprotein in the red cells of the blood in mammals and other animals. For example, hemoglobin in human's circulatory system transports oxygen from the lungs to the rest of the body, such as to the muscles, where it releases the oxygen load. If this function is blocked, the host will quickly die from hypoxia.
The hemoglobin's binding of oxygen is affected by molecules such as cyanide ion (CN-), carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur monoxide (SO), etc. For example, hemoglobin's binding affinity for CO is 200 times greater than its affinity for oxygen, and for cyanide the affinity is thousands of times greater [6] [11] [10] . This means that small amounts of cyanide (or CO, SO, etc.) dramatically inhibits oxygen-binding, reduces hemoglobin's ability to transport oxygen, hence causes grave toxicity and eventually death'.
As Figure 2 shows, at a highly abstract level we can treat the circulatory system as an enclosed (3-dimensional) space. Each hemoglobin is a molecular agent node who carries a message, which is oxygen, from one region in the space to another. Any attack that successfully blocks the message-transport function also destroys the circulatory system's function.
III. COMPLEXITY-THEORETIC MODEL OF CYANIDE POISONING
Nevertheless, the previous intuition is not a formal answer to the problem. To illustrate the network system's complex behavior under cyanide poisoning, we need a more formal specification to identify the security properties and security invariants in the scalable and probabilistic network system. 'Another basis for cyanide poisoning is by binding cyanide to the active site of cytochrome oxidase, there by stopping aerobic cell metabolism so that the cell can no longer aerobically produce ATP for energy. But this biological effect is beyond the scope of this paper. 
A. Sound model of analysis The concept of negligibility used in this paper can find its trace back to sound models of analysis. Though the concepts of "continuity" and "infinitesimal" became important in mathematics during Newton and Leibniz's time (1680s), they were not well-defined until late 1810s. The first reasonably rigorous definition of continuity in mathematic analysis was due to Bernard Bolzano, who wrote in 1817 the modern definition of continuity. Lately Cauchy and Weierstrass also defined as follows (with all numbers in the real number domain R): poly(x)
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In complexity-based modern cryptography, a security scheme is provably secure if the probability of security failure (e.g., inverting a one-way function, distinguishing cryptographically strong pseudorandom bits from truly random bits) 2Note that the reciprocal pnum is not needed if the function domain is real number. We write in this way to show the steps more clearly. 3Formal treatment of "field extension" is omitted in this paper due to page limit.
is negligible in terms of the cryptographic key length x = n. Nevertheless, the general notion of negligibility has never said that the system input parameter x must be the key length n. Indeed, x can be any predetermined system metric and corresponding mathematic analysis would illustrate some hidden analytical behaviors of the system. In our analysis, the input parameter x is changed to the number of network members N, that is, a crucial network metric which measures network scalability.
In below we propose a concept of "!QV!9-polynomial time"
protocol/algorithm as the formal model of network security and the explanation of the probabilistic nature of cyanide poisoning. Given a probabilistic Turing Machine controlled by a "global virtual god" (QVQ) who virtually oversees the entire network, the number of protocol steps is polynomially bounded by x = N, the number of network members.
B. Required complexity classes
Like modern cryptography, our net-centric security notion is based on "non-deterministic" and "probabilistic" algorithms. In modern cryptography, negligibility is defined on natural number domain N because key length n must be a natural number. Similarly, in this paper the number of network members N is also a natural number.
Definition 5: (Negligible function defined on natural number): A function ,u: N --> R is negligible if for every positive polynomial poly(x), and all sufficiently large x's (i.e., there exists Nc, for all x > Ne), 11(x) < po.y(x) D From the definition, we need to prove the mathematic property depicted in Figure 1 , that is, if per-step probability of protocol deviation/failure compared to an ideal Las Vegas protocol is negligible, then the overall probability of protocol deviation/failure after polynomial steps stays as negligible.
This means that negligibility is an asymptotic fixed point for polynomial-time algorithms.
At first, we define the ideal Las Vegas protocol for mobile ad hoc message/oxygen transportation: In a circulatory system, let's put a virtual source node at the place where an oxygen molecule originates, and a virtual destination node at the place where the oxygen molecule is supposed to be delivered. The Las Vegas case is an ideal routing scheme where we assume that the oxygen molecule could be sent from one hemoglobin to neighboring hemoglobins as if it is a broadcast packet. In practice, hemoglobins do not have this assumed capability and the routing success ratio is worse. If this Las Vegas case fails due to attack, any Monte Carlo variant will certainly fail. D
We then define the RP protocol/algorithm class with 1-side errors.
Let x be the input in the polynomial size of a system parameter N, let M(x) be the random variable denoting the output of a PTM M. Let
where d is a truly random coin-flip, tM (x) is the polynomial number of coin-flips made by M on input x, and Md (x) denotes the output of M on input x, when d is the outcome of its coin-flips (i.e., the random tape of an equivalent DTM). Negative RP n-runs class is the class of languages that can be recognized by such a probabilistic polynomial time Turing Machine. D
The procedure to obtain RP n-runs class from RP 1-run class is called RP amplification, which trivially runs an RP 1-run class algorithm n times, then the failure probability of an RP n-runs algorithm (i.e., not returning YES after running the RP 1-run algorithm n times) exponentially decreases, and becomes negligible.
C. Polynomial-time invariant property Now we prove the property depicted in Figure 1 . This property illustrates that how a node-wise local behavior at each individual peer node affects the network-wise global behavior of the entire probabilistic system, which is comprised of N < poly(N) peer nodes.
Theorem 1: If an RP n-runs protocol X's failure probability is negligible, then the failure probability stays as negligible when the same protocol X is executed polynomial times.
Proof: By assumption, X has p(N) steps, where p(N) is a positive polynomial. Given that per-step security success probability is Ponetime, the probability of success of the entire protocol Ppolytime is As depicted in Figure 3 , the entire network space is of finite size S. The finite network space S is divided into large with a large number of node "positions". The figure shows that N = 3 of r1 (N «< < O(poly(N))) such "positions" have been taken by N = 3 mobile nodes. Each empty "position" is filled with a tape of poly(N) blank symbols, and the blank tape is replaced with a mobile node's tape once the corresponding position is taken, or the tape goes back to the blank tape upon the node's leaving of the position. If the largest tape length of each mobile node can carry is I < O(poly(N)), then the gVg PTM's consummate tape length is rpl1. The gVg PTM's tape head always parks at the place corresponding to the current symbol of the first mobile node (i.e., the node with least node index). The mobile node's mobility patterns are "as if" decided by the gVg using coin-flips. In theory, the gVg does all symbol processing and coin-flipping operations and its operation speed is fast enough to process all symbols on its tape within the least network time granularity T number of tiles (or cubes for 3-D space) of tiny size s, and each tile/cube is smaller than the physical size of any single mobile node. In other words, each tile/cube is virtually a node "position" to place on. The number of node "positions" rT s is quite large. It is nevertheless a finite number. In a nutshell, r1 = is a large constant, but is always asymptotically less than poly(N), that is, r1 < O(poly(N)).
Tape Each mobile node functions as a carrier of a moving tape of polynomial size of the network scale N. That is, each mobile node carries a tape of O(poly(N)) bits. A moving tape is intuitively the computer memory snapshot of the corresponding mobile node. Let I < O(poly(N)) be the size of the largest moving tape. An empty node "position" is occupied by a blank tape of I blank symbols. This blank tape is replaced with a node's moving tape once the corresponding position is taken by the node, or the tape goes back to the blank tape upon the node's leaving of the position. If the largest tape length of each mobile node can carry is I < O(poly(N)), then the gVg PTM's consummate tape length is r1pL, which is < 0(poly(Tr)).O(poly(N)), thus < O(poly(N)).
Control state operations Each mobile node's decision of network operation (e.g., packet transmission), though autonomous in nature, can be translated into an equivalent form as if all the decisions are made by the !QV!Q using coin-flips. Along the timeline, there exists a minimal time granularity T such that any Turing Machine operation latency less than T will make no difference in network protocol execution. We model that the gVg can make decisions for all mobile nodes and emulate all the decisions globally within the granularity T (e.g., 1 nanosecond).
The mobile nodes are indexed from 1 to N. At the beginning/end of each T time granularity, the PTM's tape head always parks at the place corresponding to the current symbol of the first mobile node (with node index 1). During a T interval, the PTM processes every mobile node's tape one by one (treating the corresponding node as a puppet Turing
Machine of the QVQ).
Environmental randomness As to environmental conditions, for each network operation (e.g., message delivery), the QVQ emulates the physical condition (e.g., blood condition and obstacles that affect blood flowing) in a perfect manner, and precisely moves each message from one node to another. That is, the message content is deleted from the sending node's moving tape, and the received message content is added to the proper place of the receiving node's moving tape. In the eyes of the gVg, any message transportation is simply a movement of a set of tape symbol from one place of its consummate tape to another place. PTM as DTM with random tape If we use DTM rather than PTM to model the network protocol execution, the QVQ can pre-cast many coin-flips to emulate the probabilistic events in the network, and place the result of the coin-flips to an added consummate random tape. These probabilistic events include mobile node's probabilistic moving pattern, probabilistic message delivery requests at the message sources and destinations, and so on. The total number of coin-flips (or the length of the consummate random tape) is bounded by network space and network scale < O(poly(rq)).O(poly(N)), . gVg(Q,r) is a global virtual god oracle with finite set of states Q and a probabilistic coin-flip sequence r (i.e., the random tape input of an equivalent DTM). IQ and rl are < O(poly(N)).
. F is a finite set of the tape alphabet. . E C F is a finite set of the input alphabet.
* qleQ is the initial state.
. #c(F -) is the blank symbol. means "probability of protocol failure". In gVg _ZP5, the former one must be 1 -e(N) and the latter one must be e(N) in terms of network scale N.
Example 1: (Mobile message transportation) In a mobile network, nodes can be viewed as controlled proxy agents of the 5V5. Based on the random coin-flips (or the random tape of an equivalent DTM) that simulate the probabilistic environment, 5V5 initiates a message/oxygen 51n this paper, the notion "gVg-ZP" denotes "gVg-ZP n-runs" class for the ease of presentation.
On a source node. When intended destination node successfully accepts the message/oxygen, 5V5 enters a final acceptance state to finish the mobile message delivery. For a valid cyanide poisoning in negative 5V5 -RP, the probability of hemoglobin's oxygen-transportation FAIL-URE/NO Pr[destination cannot receive oxygen] must be 1- e(N), while the probability of transportation SUCCESS/YES Pr[destination receives oxygen] must be e(N). D
E. Mobility model
In an enclosed network space S, we divide the network space S into a large amount of small virtual tiles (cubes) of area (volume) s, so that the tile area (cube volume) is even smaller than the physical size of the smallest network node. This way, each tile (cube) is either empty, or is occupied by a single node. Also because the network space is much larger than the sum of all mobile nodes' physical size, the probability that a tile (cube) is occupied by a mobile node is very small. Now a binomial distribution B(rq, p) defines the probabilistic distribution of how these tiles (cubes) are occupied by 5 each mobile ad hoc node. Here r = , the total number of "positions", is very large but < O(poly(N)); and p, the probability that a cube is occupied by the single node, is very small. When r1 is large and p is small, it is well- where ,y,z are unit vectors in the x, y, z directions, respectively. Clearly, the term au represents the local time rate of change of the quantity or at a fixed position point. The term V Vor is a scalar representing the advectional or field changes in the flow associated with the motion of the flow. For a network of many mobile nodes flowing through a finite area, we can specify either the field of V or the paths (trajectories) of the mobile nodes. The former is normally referred to as the Eulerian description of motion while the latter is endowed with the title of Lagrangian description of motion.
In below, we will adopt an Eulerian description in our stochastic mobility analysis. The scalar quantity or is the arrival rate of an average node on a position, that is, the probability of an average node's presence at a position.
The stochastic mobility PDF Let p1 denote the mobility probability distribution function of a single node in the bounded network space S. For a network deployed in a bounded system space, let the random variable Q = (X, Y, Z) denote the Cartesian location of a mobile node in the 3-dimensional network space at an arbitrary time instant t.
The probability that a given node is located in a subspace S' of the system space S can be computed by integrating pi over this subspace 
* (Non-uniform P1) More generally, in arbitrary distribution models including non-uniform models, the arrival rate is location dependent. The probability that there are exactly k nodes in a specific space S' is
The choice of p1 depends on the underlying mobility model. Some stochastic mobility models which directly choose a destination direction rather than a destination point and allow a bound back or wrap-around behavior at the border of the system area, including the random walk model on a 2-D torus surface, are able to achieve a uniform spatial distribution [2] [3] [1] . However, P1 is typically non-uniform.
Fortunately, our gVg -RP and negative gVg -RP models do not assume any specific mobility model and mobile node presence PDF. As depicted in Figure 4 , the stochastic PDF can be an arbitrary but continuous function over the network area/space. In this section, we use the negligibility-based model to explain a theoretic reason why cyanide poisoning is fatal. We show that the success probability of carrying message at a single node is negligible under cyanide poisoning.
As specified previously, there are N nodes in the bounded network area, amongst them there are O N compromised The mobility PDF p is arbitrary in our study as long as it is continuous in the space S, thus could be location dependent and becomes a function of the location space S. Therefore, triple integrals must be used here. Fortunately, because e' is a fixed point in differential and integral calculus, that is dex eX and fex dx ex + C = O(ex), such integrals or differentials do not change the magnitude of order. In a nutshell, exponential orders 0(eN) and polynomial orders O(poly(N)) are unchanged in magnitude through these integrals or differentials. And this concludes that the last step e(N) holds.
Hence we have proved that cyanide poisoning reduces nodewise success probability of oxygen-transport to c(N) for every single hemoglobin node. Then by the asymptotic invariant proved in Theorem 1, the network-wise success probability of oxygen-transport by all N < poly(N) nodes stays as e(N).
In a nutshell, cyanide poisoning reduces an oxygen-transport protocol into the negative gVg -RP class.
G. Countermeasuring treatments
Nevertheless, it is easy to restore an algorithm/protocol from the negative RP class to the RP class. This can be done by introducing treatment agents that have a much greater binding affinity for cyanide ion than hemoglobin [12] [5] [7] . For example, cyanide preferentially bonds to methemoglobin rather than the cytochrome oxidase, and hydroxycobalamin (a form of vitamin B12) can be used to bind cyanide to form the harmless vitamin Bl2a cyanocobalamin. A treatment like this can be analyzed below.
Suppose we can introduce -a N treatment agent nodes to bind with cyanide ion. The probability that there are k such treatment agents in the space S' is This is a 1 -e(N) quantity. In contrast, the failure probability becomes e(N). This way, the hemoglobin node's oxygentransport scheme is converted from the negative RP class back to the RP class.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have formally describe the behavior of cyanide poisoning following a complexity-theoretic approach.
Like modern cryptography, security threat in our networkcentric model is defined on the complexity-theoretic concept of "negligible" e(x), which is asymptotically sub-polynomial with respect to a pre-defined system parameter x. The parameter x is the key length n in modern cryptography, but is changed to the total number of network nodes N in our model.
We draw an analogy of biological cyanide poisoning to security attacks in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks. When the victim circulatory system is treated as an enclosed network space, a hemoglobin is treated as a mobile node, and a hemoglobin binding with cyanide ion is treated as a compromised node, we define a randomized complexity class QVQ -RP to show how cyanide poisoning can reduce the probability of oxygen/message delivery to a c(N) quantity. This is accomplished in two steps: (1) We prove that the negligibility property e(N) is an asymptotic invariant in terms of the input parameter N for any polynomial-time algorithm; (2) We also prove that the life-sustaining node-wise oxygentransport function succeeds (or fails in case of poisoning treatment) with c(N) probability, then by the invariant property the network-wise oxygen-transport function also succeeds (or fails in case of poisoning treatment) with the invariant e(N) probability. This leads to a new analysis of biological threats based on network and complexity theoretic study. To verify the theoretic analysis, we are developing a discreteevent simulation program (similar to [9] ) which creates a parallel computing thread for every biological node and simulates biochemical processes by computational processes. The simulation results will be shown in a separated report.
